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Tweaking the Market for Autonomy:
A Problem-Solving Perspective to
Informed Consent in Arbitration
CLARK FRESHMAN*
This article looks at shortcomings in how arbitration promotes
autonomy from a problem-solving perspective:' How can we tweak
market incentives so that arbitration really lives up to (one of) its key
promises?2 In contrast, some quickly assume a perfect market in which
every arbitration agreement necessarily reflects a fully informed and free
choice, and others quickly assume a market so unequal and imperfect
that "agreements" to arbitrate reflect no meaningful choice.' In some
contexts, one set of assumptions may make far more sense: if two exper-
ienced arbitration providers reach their own agreement to arbitrate their
dispute, this may represent autonomy as much as any market transaction
ever could; if a poor, uneducated person signs an employment arbitra-
tion agreement, there may be no sense in which the decision reflects
autonomy.
This article looks in between these extremes and across many con-
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Brown, Michael Froomkin, Patrick Gudridge, Steve Halpert, Bernard Oxman, Rick Williamson,
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speaker series, and the law firm of Broad & Cassell for helpful comments and suggestions. I am
grateful to the University of Miami Law Library, and particularly Barbara Cuadras and Sue Ann
Campbell. I am also grateful for research assistance to Enza Boderone, Adam Engel, Alyson
Greenfield, Igal Katz, Gina Renzelli, and Ari Tenzer, and for administrative support to Beth
Hanson and Felicia Martin.
1. On problem-solving in the law, see, for example, Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, Lawyers as
Problem Solvers, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 811 (1999).
2. On autonomy as a key value in arbitration, see, for example, Alan Scott Rau, The
UNCITRAL Model Law in State and Federal Courts: The Case of "Waiver, " 6 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 223, 252 (1995). Autonomy is by no means the only possible value of arbitration.
Arbitration may further other values, such as cutting the time, costs, and acrimony of ordinary
litigation.
3. For a more nuanced view of choice in arbitration, but voicing the concerns about lack of
choice, see, for example, Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77
N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999). For a strong defense of choice in arbitration, with some qualifications,
see Stephen Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83
MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999) (arguing that arbitrators should usually be able to adopt the best rules
for deciding cases and that courts compete with arbitrators for the development of the "best" law
much as the post office and Federal Express compete in offering the best delivery service).
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texts4 to look at some common barriers and common pathways to auton-
omy. Like many problem-solving exercises, it defines the topic of
autonomy and informed consent broadly, looks at various objectives in
promoting autonomy, and considers even seemingly idealistic solutions.'
So, too, like many problem-solving exercises, it is meant to be a collabo-
rative enterprise, and it anticipates others will identify other problems-
and other solutions! In short, the article is less an answer than a ques-
tion: How can we try to make arbitration more like the exercise in auton-
omy and informed decision-making that so many think it should be?
The article is therefore primarily an exercise in theory and jurispru-
dence rather than an exploration of existing doctrine. Still, the theory
implicitly has doctrinal implications: to the extent that the market short-
comings described below undercut autonomy in a particular setting, then
we should treat arbitration less favorably. In extreme cases, this may
mean we would not enforce any agreement to arbitrate. In other cases,
this might mean the provisions would be enforced but suspect terms not
enforced and/or additional terms implied into the contract. For example,
if one thought that consumers had little choice in negotiating an arbitra-
tion provision with the only water company in town, then one might not
enforce a provision that arbitrators be drawn only from panels of those
with years of water industry experience. In a similar way, if a provision
for arbitration in a medical malpractice case made no mention of how a
patient could get a hospital's records, one might interpret the arbitration
contract to allow the patient some access to the records.
With this problem-solving method and possible doctrinal implica-
tions in the background, this article explores the potential of arbitration
to promote autonomy by addressing four questions. First, what might
autonomy mean in arbitration? Second, what kind of autonomy do
existing market incentives likely lead existing market actors (parties to
disputes; lawyers; ADR providers like the American Arbitration Associ-
ation) to provide? Third, assuming that market actors have some incen-
4. In contrast, others attempt to typologize types of dispute scenarios and the problems most
associated with those particular kinds of scenarios. See, e.g., Sarah Jane Cole, Uniform
Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON Dis,. RESOL. 759, 760 (2001)
("[it would be appropriate to provide different default rules governing arbitration depending on
the status of the parties involved in the arbitration."); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed
Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 775, 827 (1999) (stating that a mediator should have more responsibility to ensure
informed consent by parties when parties are: (1) forced to mediate; and/or (2) not represented by
counsel). This is certainly another valuable enterprise; however, it overlooks the ways in which
many common barriers addressed here may cut across contexts of types of disputes and types of
parties.
5. See, e.g., DAVID PERKINS, ARCHIMEDES' BATHTUB: THE ART AND LoGC OF
BREAKTHROUGH THINKING 51 (2000) (suggesting that creative solutions are easier when people
engage in "roving far and wide" for ideas).
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tive to promote some kind of autonomy, what barriers might inhibit
them? Fourth, how might we enhance the ability of arbitration to pro-
mote autonomy by changing market incentives and addressing barriers
to promoting autonomy?
I. THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF AUTONOMY IN ARBITRATION
As a preliminary working definition, I define autonomy as the abil-
ity of an entity to make informed choices6 about its significant practices,
including how it resolves disputes. Entity includes both individuals and
organizations.7 Whenever an entity resolves a particular dispute by a
particular process, be that some kind of litigation, some kind of media-
tion, or some type of arbitration, it implicitly chooses one kind of pro-
cess over another. It makes sense to conclude this choice reflects
autonomy if we think that the entity has made an informed choice.
Although it's beyond dispute that autonomy and informed consent
are generally bedrock American values,8 it's worth considering why we
should care at all that entities make informed choices about arbitration
rather than some other set of decisions, like the interest rate on loans, the
price of a car, and so on. For some, decisions about arbitration matter
more because we should care more about choices about procedural jus-
tice compared to, say, choices about liquidated damages provisions. 9 At
6. Another important topic is consent to arbitration. Consent in arbitration is itself a huge
and well-explored topic, including many critiques of the way courts enforce agreements to
arbitrate even when consumers may not have had much bargaining power. See, e.g., Sternlight,
supra note 3; see also Stone, supra note 3. It may well be that there is an important relationship
between the kind of bargaining power a party has and the kind of information appropriate to make
known to an individual, but this article instead concentrates more on what information an entity
knows rather than factors like market power that make some choices less attractive.
7. By labeling both as entities, I mean to emphasize the way that individuals can be seen as a
coalition of various potential selves, combining various potential obligations, commitments,
communities, and cultures. See, e.g., GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC
INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON (1992).
8. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 4, at 781 ("Informed consent is the foundational moral
and ethical principle that promotes respect for individual self-determination and honors human
dignity.").
9. It is worth noting that the long-standing distinction between decisions about procedural
justice and decisions about other types of justice popularized by such scholars as Hart and Sacks
of the legal process school, see HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1994), is
certainly subject to criticism. For a critical perspective, see generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). More specifically, one might question why an individual
does (or should) care more about questions of whether an arbitrator decides something compared
to other aspects of a contract. From a certain purely monetary point of view, one might plausibly
debate whether arbitration or some other clause has a greater effect on the probable outcome. See
generally David Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator's Tool, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113
(1996) (illustrating how a mediator could suggest reasonable settlements in a case by using
decision analysis of various potential actions, such as odds of admitting certain evidence, winning
certain motions and so on, to arrive at a predicted value of a case). In some instances, for
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least for the Supreme Court, the importance of some scrutiny of proce-
dural choices matters because individuals may simply lack the back-
ground to realize the implications of their choices, such as the way some
have tried to use arbitral clauses to exclude punitive damages' 0 or to let
arbitrators decide the exact scope of what they will get to decide."
Together, these concerns give us enough reason to want some kind of
informed consent that we must confront some very practical questions.
Exactly how many resources we devote to the process of informed con-
sent and exactly what tradeoffs we might make with other commitments
involving arbitration (such as its private nature) will depend on some
deeper thinking about the value of autonomy. This section therefore
starts with some inevitable practical questions because even they will
seem important to many. Still, some may be difficult to answer given
the market incentives and various barriers described below. The next
section considers progressively more complicated and abstract rationales
for autonomy and informed consent.
Any attempt to inform entities about arbitration involves a series of
questions: First, what are the essential features of arbitration to describe?
Second, when and how should one describe not merely formal features
but practical consequences, such as the potential for bias? Third,
example, the effect of a standard choice of law clause, by denying certain damages available in
some states but not others, might have a greater probability of having an effect on the probable
outcome.
In reply, some might argue that the importance of procedural choices reflects the way that
individuals might actually feel, as reflected by studies of the psychology of procedural justice.
See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). Moreover, critical feminists and
critical race scholars note that this importance of process, and the sense of respect by the process,
may be particularly important in the felt experiences of women and people of color. See, e.g.,
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359.
This article does not attempt to resolve these debates but rather explores the possibilities of
informed consent. However, it is worth noting that the perception of satisfaction and the
perception of consent may be problematic. See infra note 119 and accompanying text (stating that
perception of satisfaction is an imperfect standard for informed consent if people do not accurately
understand their choices).
10. Although it is a matter of some controversy whether arbitration clauses may explicitly
prevent arbitrators from awarding punitive damages, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
idea that a brokerage firm could get this effect simply because a choice of law clause mentioned
New York law, and because New York case law prevented arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 60 (1995) (expressing
doubt that a consumer would realize that a reference to choice of law would include New York
case law on the powers of arbitrators). See generally Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723 (Ala.
2002) (holding that arbitration clause cannot prevent arbitrator from awarding punitive damages).
11. First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (stating that "the 'who (primarily)
should decide arbitrability' question-is rather arcane. A party often might not focus upon that
question or upon the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers ... ")
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case that addresses the
exact scope of Kaplan. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1171 (2002).
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whether and how should one describe certain optional variations on arbi-
tration? Fourth, by what media (such as written; oral; video; interactive
video; and/or workshop format) should information be presented?
A. Relatively Practical Questions
1. Existing Attempts at Information About Arbitration
Existing descriptions of arbitration under-emphasize choice in arbi-
tration and over-emphasize formal perspectives. Many descriptions fail
to recognize that many features in arbitration often vary. For example,
descriptions of arbitration often describe arbitration as "final" and not
appealable. One state statute, for example, requires arbitration provi-
sions to include a statement in capital letters that "AFTER A DECI-
SION BY AN ARBITRATOR, NORMALLY A COURT WILL
REFUSE TO HEAR THE FACTS IN A CASE IN ALL BUT THE
MOST UNUSUAL SITUATIONS.... ,12 This statement is incomplete
for many reasons. First, many leading arbitration providers, including
JAMS/Endispute"3 and the International Chamber of Commerce, 14 pro-
vide that their own arbitration at least sometimes involves a second
round of review of an arbitration by a new arbitrator or set of arbitrators.
Second, in at least some cases, courts have shown a greater willingness
to review arbitration awards. In the most prominent example, the Sec-
ond Circuit vacated an arbitral panel's decision that there was no age
discrimination when the court determined that the panel must have
ignored the law and/or disregarded the facts.' 5 Third, most courts have
allowed parties to contract to have courts review arbitration awards with
the same scrutiny they apply to court judgments.' 6
Apart from how to describe features frequently mentioned, there
remain a series of often overlooked questions about what other features
of arbitration deserve some discussion. What are the filing fees in arbi-
tration versus court?' 7 What are the costs of paying an arbitrator? What
is the availability of discovery? What are the options of joining one's
case with similar cases in a class action or class arbitration? 8
12. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.865 (Baldwin 1984).
13. JAMS, Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure, available at http://www.Jamsadr.com/
optionalArbAppeal.asp.
14. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION,
RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 27 (2001).
15. Haligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998).
16. See, e.g., Gateway Techs. v. MCI Telecomms., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995).
17. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. 1998) (invalidating
selection of International Chamber of Commerce as arbitrator in form contract when ICC charged
very high minimum rates).
18. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will
the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
20021
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
2. Formal Comparisons Versus Practical Consequences
Another complication is how we convey information about the way
that procedures affect outcomes. One could go beyond the usual gener-
alizations about formal features, like appeals, in three kinds of ways: (1)
discussing more of the formal differences in procedure between courts
and arbitrations; (2) discussing evidence of what arbitrators and courts
may actually do; and/or (3) discussing some of the options for custom-
izing arbitration.
Even without much empirical study, one could try to give further
information about formal differences. Consider the examples of appeals
and juries. Many state statutes require that arbitration provisions in cer-
tain contracts include specific language that parties, by agreeing to arbi-
trate, lose their rights to appeal and/or jury trials.' 9  By itself, the stark
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (West 2002) (requiring that any health care
service plan that includes terms that require binding arbitration to settle disputes include, in clear
and understandable language, a disclosure which states whether the subscriber is waiving his or
her right to a jury trial); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(D) (West 2002) (requiring that any
arbitration agreement for controversies involving hospital or medical care which are entered prior
to rendering such care provide, if appropriate, that its terms constitute a waiver of any right to a
trial in court, or a waiver of any right to a trial by jury); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West
1982) (requiring that in any contract for medical services which contains a provision for
arbitration there appear the following, in at least ten-point bold red type: "NOTICE: BY
SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP
YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.865 (Baldwin
1984). The statute provides that in order for the informal dispute resolution system, offered by a
motor vehicle manufacturer to a buyer, to be binding on both parties, the written agreement
whereby the dispute is submitted to the system must include in conspicuous, bold-faced type the
following statement:
YOU SHOULD REMEMBER THAT BY ENTERING INTO THIS AGREEMENT
YOU ARE DECIDING TO USE THIS DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM TO
SETTLE YOUR DISPUTE INSTEAD OF GOING TO COURT. AFTER A
DECISION BY AN ARBITRATOR, NORMALLY A COURT WILL REFUSE TO
HEAR THE FACTS IN A CASE IN ALL BUT THE MOST UNUSUAL
SITUATIONS ....
Id. See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-a (McKinnie 1986) (requiring that arbitration
election notices provided by health maintenance organizations to enrollees contain the following
provision: "By signing this form, I am agreeing to have any issue of alleged health care
malpractice decided by neutral arbitration rather than by a court trial before a judge or jury...");
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-3 (Michie 1976) (requiring that arbitration agreements between
hospitals or physicians and patients contain the following provision in twelve-point boldface type:
"By signing this contract you are agreeing to have any issue of medical malpractice decided by
neutral arbitration and you are giving up your right to a jury or court trial"); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. § 4590i (Vernon 1993) (providing that no physician, professional association of physicians,
or other health care provider shall request or require a patient to execute an agreement to arbitrate
a health care liability claim unless the form of agreement delivered to the patient contains the
following written notice: "THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS A WAIVER OF IMPORTANT
LEGAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY. YOU SHOULD NOT SIGN THIS
AGREEMENT WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING WITH AN ATTORNEY"); CAL. FIN. CODE
§ 17331 (West 1999) (providing that when an escrow agent is applying for a Fidelity Corporation
[Vol. 56:909
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statement that arbitration proceedings are subject to only limited appeals
may imply far more of a tradeoff of rights than doctrine and practice
really suggest. Rather than merely saying that arbitration involves rela-
tively limited appeals, one could more precisely compare appeals from
court judgments with appeals from arbitration. Although most court
judgments are subject to some appeal, many key questions are not sub-
ject to any meaningful appeals: where judgments may turn on questions
of whether a jury believed one witness or another, courts of appeal apply
a very deferential review.2" Apart from these complications with
Certificate, the application form shall include a provision for binding arbitration regarding
disputes as to a decision by Fidelity Corporation which includes the following notice: "UPON AN
AGREEMENT TO SUBMIT TO BINDING NEUTRAL ARBITRATION, THE APPLICANT
HAS NO RIGHT TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE CONCERNING THIS CERTIFICATE
APPLICATION LITIGATED IN A COURT OR JURY TRIAL NOR ANY JUDICIAL RIGHTS
TO DISCOVERY AND APPEAL, EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED IN THE
ESCROW LAW..."); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1298 (West 1994). The statute provides that
when a provision for binding arbitration is included in a printed contract to convey real property
or in a printed contract between principals and agents in real property sales transactions, there
appear the following notice:
NOTICE: BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW YOU ARE AGREEING TO
HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE
"ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES" PROVISION DECIDED BY NEUTRAL
ARBITRATION AS PROVIDED BY CALIFORNIA LAW AND YOU ARE
GIVING UP RIGHTS YOU MIGHT POSSESS TO HAVE THE DISPUTE
LITIGATED IN A COURT OR JURY TRIAL. BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE
BELOW YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR JUDICIAL RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY
AND APPEAL UNLESS THOSE RIGHTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN
THE "ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES" PROVISION ....
Id. See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403 (West 1997) (requiring that any agreement for
the provision of medical services which has a provision for binding arbitration contain the
following notice in at least ten-point boldface type: "NOTE BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT
YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED
BY NEUTRAL BINDING ARBITRATION RATHER THAN BY A JURY OR COURT
TRIAL"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5652 (1985) (requiring that any agreement to arbitrate include
a written acknowledgment of arbitration which shall provide substantially as follows: "I
understand that [this agreement] contains an agreement to arbitrate. After signing [this] document,
I understand that I will not be able to bring a lawsuit concerning any dispute that may arise which
is covered by the arbitration agreement"); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756,
761 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that arbitration clause in employee handbook was unenforceable even
though employee signed a form acknowledging receipt of revised employee handbook, where
nothing in the form notified employee either that the handbook contained arbitration clause or that
acceptance of handbook constituted a waiver of his right to judicial forum); Wolfman v.
Herbstritt, 495 N.Y.S. 201, 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that an arbitration agreement
signed by patient prior to surgery was unenforceable where the agreement failed to inform the
patient that she was waiving her right to trial by judge or jury); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of
Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that an adhesion contract that required patient
receiving abortion services to arbitrate medical malpractice disputes was unenforceable where
there was no conspicuous or explicit waiver of fundamental fight to jury trial).
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (providing that factual determinations will not be set aside on
appeal unless clearly erroneous); see also, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 948-49 (1995) (holding that when there is basically just a dispute about facts, the standard of
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appeals from court, we saw above that parties often may appeal an arbi-
tration award to other arbitrators and/or court.2 '
In a similar way, statements that arbitration involves the waiving of
a "right to a jury" also overstate the differences between court and arbi-
tration in at least two ways. First, not every kind of a claim involves the
right to a jury.22 Second, even when there is a right to a jury trial, courts
may still dismiss a case by motion.2 3
In principle, information about arbitration could also go still farther
by looking not just at formal features but at empirical evidence. In some
instances, there may be relatively reliable empirical evidence. For
example, studies show that courts formally dismiss many claims in the
federal courts on some kind of motion to dismiss in one-third of cases.24
Even here, however, some might question the statistics. Perhaps one-
third seems too high if, as many believe, state courts grant fewer
motions to dismiss. Or, one-third might seem too low because courts
may not dismiss all of a claim but rule on a motion that substantially
affects the likely outcome, such as ruling out punitive damages or a
major legal theory.
To give an even fuller picture of arbitration, one might consider
other evidence about what arbitrators actually do. There are several
widely held beliefs about arbitration. Many presume arbitration is faster
and cheaper, yet there is intense disagreement in different studies about
this. Most recently, a RAND Institute study concluded that arbitration
often does not save time when compared to court.25 Many, including at
review is deferential). A trial court judge, on the other hand, has discretion to order a new trial if
she thinks the jury went against the weight of the evidence. See FED. R, Civ. P. 59(a), (d); see
also Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 499 U.S. 33 (1980) (holding that a trial court's order for
a new trial is left to the discretion of the trial judge). But this very discretionary power of the trial
judge may not be what someone reading about waiving a right to appeal has in mind.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
22. See, e.g., Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 447 (1830). Instead, the United States
Constitution only requires a jury when there was such a right at common law. Id.
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317
(1986) (holding that court may dismiss claim if party with burden of production has had time for
discovery but cannot identify any supporting evidence); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-48
(1957) (holding that court can dismiss claim based on pleadings alone if it is clear that no set of
facts would lead to different result).
24. Of those cases filed in court, only a very small percentage are resolved by a trial.
MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 218 (2d ed. 1996).
Decisions short of a verdict, however, do affect a substantial number of cases. Id. (stating that
courts dismiss about one-third of cases on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment); see also Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DisP. RESOL.
1, 9 n.21; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1521-22 (1995) (providing recent statistics on cases dismissed on
motion).
25. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF
JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 87, 93 (1996). Critics of
[Vol. 56:909
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26least one Supreme Court opinion, presume that arbitrators tend toward
compromise decisions, avoiding both outright dismissals of claims and
huge awards. Should such beliefs be discussed also, or should they be
omitted until there is clearer empirical study?
Another popularly held belief is that arbitrators may not follow the
same law as courts, but instead apply industry or community norms.
There is certainly some support for this view since some court decisions
defer to arbitrators as the experts in an industry. 27  In a similar way,
many suggest that arbitrators may base decisions on their own sense of
efficiency rather than what the law requires.28 Sometimes this broad
statement is tied to formal provisions that give arbitrators such power,
such as the formal provisions of some Latin American arbitration laws.29
the study have taken a two-pronged approach, sometimes criticizing the accuracy of the study in
considering costs and time, and other times criticizing it for not focusing on values other than cost
and time. See, e.g., Bryan Garth, Civil Procedure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103,
107 (1997) ("RAND simply could not make comparative evaluations of fairness or equality.").
One critic summarizes both sets of critiques:
According to the mediation defenders, the programs studied were not representative
of those in federal courts; they were poorly implemented examples of mediation;
they were studied in their early stages before improvements were implemented; and
the research too narrowly construed the impact of mediation, focusing primarily on
time and cost rather than on the less tangible benefits relating to quality and party
satisfaction.
CRAIG A. McEwEN, Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the Effective Use of
Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHio ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. I, 2
(1998) (citation omitted). Moreover, as Carrie Menkel-Meadow noted, the study did not consider
the long-term effects of ADR programs, particularly whether the availability of mediation
programs leads to more or fewer claims in the future, and how it may affect the types of claims
brought. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OIo ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 19, 56-57 (1999).
[W]e do not really know how the availability of ADR in courts (and in the private
sector) affects choices about claiming behavior-whether more will claim in the
first place (the increased "access" argument) or whether the choice of how or where
to claim will change (whether claimants will resist ADR and pursue litigation,
pursue both, or whether more litigants are "lumping it" after "losing" in ADR).
Id. (citations omitted). On the sometimes slow pace of arbitration, see also Engalla v. Permanente
Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (holding arbitration agreement void for fraud when
information on arbitration claimed it was faster than court, but arbitrations for the particular party
seeking arbitration generally took longer than in court).
26. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280-81 (1995) (finding that
arbitration will not necessarily help or hurt all consumers but may help those with smaller claims
and hurt those with stronger claims).
27. See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582 (1960) ("The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his
knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.").
28. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 3.
29. As one experienced arbitrator and scholar sees it, arbitrators sometimes practice as if they
had such broad powers:
On occasion, even arbitrators not acting as mediators or empowered to decide as
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On the other hand, at least when it comes to some statutory questions,
the Supreme Court and others suggest that arbitrators should follow the
law.3°
3. Optional Features, Selection of Arbitrators, and
Community-Making
Another increasingly important complication to describing arbitra-
tion involves the varieties of arbitration. Most of the comparisons
above, like comparisons included in statutes, compare court and arbitra-
tion. One can readily imagine standard contrasts of other processes as
well (such as mediation, negotiation, and litigation).3 ' Many would also
add some increasingly familiar "hybrid" processes such as mediation-
arbitration32 and minitrials. 33 But these are really the very least of arbi-
tration varieties.
We also face the far harder question of how to describe potential
processes. The Supreme Court tells us arbitration is a creature of con-
tract, and the lower courts seem frequently willing to let parties mix,
match, and create arbitration in a variety of ways on the theory that
arbitration is simply another contract.34 Some of these choices involve
the relatively mechanical questions that fill the many continuing legal
education classes on drafting arbitration clauses, such as the number of
arbitrators, the costs of arbitration, the amount of discovery, and so
forth.3 5 Many of these options, like appeals of arbitral awards, seem
amiables compositeurs may be tempted to abandon the rules of law in favor of the
more fluid principles of fairness. The arbitrators' motivation seems to be that ad
hoc justice, according to their sense of fairness rather than according to legal rules,
permits finer distinctions to suit the particularities of a specific case.
William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in
International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 661 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
30. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79 (1998).
31. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 11 (1976).
32. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 235 (3d ed. 1999).
33. Id. at 239.
34. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 469
(1989) ("[Pjarties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as
they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate . . . so too may they specify by
contract the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted.").
35. See generally, e.g., RICHARD CHERNICK, MIx & MATCH: CREATING TAILORED DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CLAUSES (1996); see also MODEL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS FOR USE IN
COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARTIES WITH EQUAL BARGAINING POWER (1999); Alan S.
Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause: Drafting and Implementation
Issues Which Should Be Considered by a Consumer Lender, 1302 PRAC. LAW INST. 7, 127 (2002).
Exactly how often entities take the advice to customize arbitration provisions, and exactly
what custom forms they use, is unclear. I know of no empirical research on how often entities
customize arbitration agreements on such dimensions, which is understandable given the
difficulties of accessing arbitrations themselves, let alone agreements to arbitrate.
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quite radical to arbitration purists. Yet, as we saw, most lower courts
now allow parties to provide that courts will review arbitration awards
as if they were court judgments rather than under the highly deferential
review usually given arbitration awards. 36
At a minimum, entities should know that arbitration involves many
potential choices. Consider a simple statement like: "Arbitration ordina-
rily involves __, but parties may agree to customize arbitration in a
variety of ways, such as __ " There is still room to debate which
features to treat as essential, and how to describe them; that simple sen-
tence simply opens individuals to understand that their choices are not
simply binary between "court" and "arbitration." Such advice may seem
more appropriate the more that parties seem to have the power to bar-
gain over contracts, but it may seem unhelpful in seemingly "take-it-or-
leave-it" situations such as form contracts with lenders, landlords, or
employers. Still, the information may have some value. First, it may be
difficult for a single party to change arbitration in a particular transac-
tion, but information about options over time may prompt enough ques-
tions to check the over-reaching of more powerful parties. Second,
individuals may have more opportunities than they think to negotiate
over terms in an arbitration agreement. In many form agreements in the
securities industry, for example, individuals have the option to select one
of several listed providers.37 Even in seemingly take-it-or-leave-it con-
36. See, e.g., Gateway Techs. v. MCI Telecomms., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
37. See, e.g., UBS Paine Webber, Account Application and Agreement for Individuals, their
Estates, Trusts, and Custodial Accounts, available at http://www.ubspainewebber.com/PWIC/
CMA/workflow/FILE-DATA/PWA/pdf/account-application-for-individuals-estates-trusts.pdf
(last visited June 7, 2002). The agreement provides:
Any arbitration under this Agreement shall be held under and pursuant to and be
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, and shall be conducted before an
arbitration panel convened by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. or the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Client may also select any other national
securities exchange's arbitration forum in which UBS PaineWebber is legally
required to arbitrate the controversy with Client, including, where applicable, the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.
Id. See also Merrill Lynch, Client Relationship Agreement, available at http://
www.mldirect.ml.conpublish/Mldirnewacct.pdf (last visited June 7, 2002) (providing that "[alny
arbitration pursuant to this provision shall be conducted only before the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., an arbitration facility provided by any other exchange of which you are a member,
or the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and in accordance with its arbitration rules
then in effect"); Charles Schwab, Schwab IRA Application, available at https://investing.schwab.
com/servlet/SchwablRAApplication (last visited June 7, 2002). The application provides:
This arbitration will be conducted by, and according to the securities arbitration
rules and regulations then in effect of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Pacific Stock Exchange, or Chicago
Board Options Exchange. Either of us may initiate arbitration by filing a written
claim with the NASD or one of the other organizations specified above.
Id. See also American Express Brokerage, IRA Client Agreement for Brokerage Accounts,
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tracts, such as with car dealers, there may be room for negotiation. A
colleague who teaches ADR was successful in getting an auto sales per-
son to change the provider of arbitration in the sales contract.
Although there may be many candidates for the kind of options that
deserve attention, the option to choose the specific arbitrator or type of
arbitrator (such as specifying that arbitrators have specific experiences
or community ties) has both especially important practical consequences
and theoretical significance for autonomy. Even on relatively narrow
economic terms, the choice of arbitrator may matter both to parties and
to society. Many experts on arbitration think that the choice of arbitrator
has more effect on the outcome than many other factors. Some charac-
terize the selection merely as finding the arbitrator with the appropriate
expertise: some think industry insiders will get at the facts faster and/or
more accurately. 8 And from a conventional macroeconomic viewpoint,
available at https://finance.americanexpress.com/trade2/apply/ira/apps/iraapp.asp (last visited
June 7, 2002). The agreement provides:
Any controversy arising out of, or relating to, my accounts, to transactions with you
or your Brokers and/or employees for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration and conducted pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act,
before the American Arbitration Association, or the National Association of
Securities Dealers Inc., Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., the New York Stock
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange to the extent you may be a member of
such exchange or the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board or the independent
nonindustry arbitration forum as I may elect.
Id. See also Salomon Smith Barney, Qualified Retirement Account and IRA Client Agreement,
available at http://www.salomonsmithbarney.com/pdf/account-management-forms/ps2018.pdf
(last visited Apr. 2002) (providing that claims and controversies "shall be determined by
arbitration before, and only before, any self-regulatory organization or exchange of which SSB is
a member. I may elect which of these arbitration forums shall hear the matter..."); Morgan
Stanley, Plan Disclosure Statement and Participation Agreement, available at http://www.
msdwadvice.com/accountoptions/529/pdf/plan-disc-pa.pdf (last revised Feb. 28, 2002). The
agreement provides:
[An] arbitration under this Participation Agreement shall be conducted only before
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., an arbitration facility provided by any other
exchange of which the Manager (or the Independent Distributor, if applicable) is a
member, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and in accordance
with its arbitration rules then in force.
Id. See also Quick & Reilly, Account Agreement and Information Guide, available at http://
www.quickandreilly.com/pdf/agree-InfoGuide.pdf (last revised Dec. 2001). The account
agreement provides:
[A]ny controversy between you and Quick & Reilly, Inc., U.S. Clearing and/or any
of its officers, directors, employees, agents or affiliates relating to the account
agreement, your account and the transactions therein, or in any way arising out of
your relationship with Q&R and/or USC, will be settled by arbitration in accordance
with the rules then in effect of the New York Stock Exchange or National
Association of Securities Dealers ....
Id.
38. See generally, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960) (stating that an arbitrator familiar with practices of a particular workplace will
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the outcome of individual cases may encourage actors to behave in ways
more or less helpful to the economy.39
An example of practical consequences: A clothing designer client
of mine once found himself in what he thought would be a "garment
industry" arbitration. When a dispute arose, it was decided by three gar-
ment manufacturers rather than the creative types he expected. Even if
we do not want to frame his earlier agreement to arbitrate before people
in the "garment industry" in the language of community, it is a more
significant commitment than the usual contractual commitment. It
involves well above usual uncertainty about potential changes in what
his contract means as the views of people in his industry change. As the
designer's case illustrates, arbitration often does not merely involve a
commitment, but a commitment to a relatively broad set of future com-
mitments defined by a relatively narrow set of practices.4 °
Choices of arbitrator may not merely affect outcome in cases but
even reflect-and change-our sense of identity and community. When
we choose to arbitrate before some kind of arbitration organization, such
as international commercial arbitration,4' Orthodox Jewish arbitration,
Islamic arbitration, or gay and lesbian arbitration, we define ourselves as
international business persons, Jews, Muslims, or gays and lesbians.4"
identify the relevant facts more quickly and accurately); Smith v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 233 F.3d
502 (7th Cir. 2000).
39. Cf Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25, at 56-57 (noting that arbitration may effect the
likelihood that people will bring claims in the future).
40. The contrast with other commercial cases should not be exaggerated. We often might
imagine a contract involves only a commitment to known commitments at this time (including the
knowledge of who bears the risk of some uncertainty, such as the risk of inflation). However,
modem contract theory, exemplified by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), sometimes
involves a commitment to be bound by the changing norms of a particular industry. Moreover, as
Lisa Bernstein's recent empirical work shows, this mainstay of the UCC may rest on an inaccurate
assumption that there are shared norms within an industry. See generally Lisa Bernstein, The
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Study: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 710 (1999). In another similar example, contracts sometimes include commitments to be
bound by an agreement whose terms may be changed from time to time in the future, but this
commitment often includes an ability to exit when the terms change. Cf. Bradie v. Bank of Am.,
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 278-80 (1998) (finding that Bank of America could not impose arbitration
merely because its form agreements with consumers reserved a right to amend terms when there
was not a term that would give notice of possible amendment to add arbitration). I am extremely
grateful to Michael Froomkin for prompting me to think about these other cases.
41. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1995)
(discussing the ways in which arbitrators may create norms for international business through their
decisions).
42. See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator
from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 275, 275 n. 1 (1999) (addressing the ability of arbitration to protect in general "an individual
whose core religious, political or social values and beliefs differ meaningfully and substantially
from majoritarian norms," and particularly lesbians and gays); Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-
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Moreover, as I have suggested elsewhere of mediation, particular com-
munities may see such dispute resolution as community-enhancing,
designed not just to resolve disputes but to inculcate participants with
the values of a particular community.43 These choices may apply even
in commercial cases: one widely used textbook includes a Jewish arbi-
tration of a claim over rent due on a commercial property!'
4. The Medium of Presentation & The Individual
Presenters of Information
The discussion above opens a lot of room to convey more and bet-
ter information about arbitration, but it is easy to get stuck on technical
limits to conveying information. In particular, it is easy to assume that it
will be too time consuming and costly to explain so many options.
Many assertions of the "tragic" choices between conveying information
and doing substantive justice assume that information may only be con-
veyed by relatively busy and expensive professionals. Of course, this is
certainly one option: in medicine, doctors may discuss options with cli-
ents in person; likewise one option to enhance informed consent regard-
ing dispute resolution is to strengthen requirements that lawyers
themselves discuss options with clients.
Other individuals and other media, however, may also convey
information. In the experiment of the multi-door courthouse, for exam-
ple, court officers may discuss different dispute resolution options with
those who come to file a suit: litigation, mediation, arbitration, and so
on.45 More importantly, there may not always be a need for individuals
to convey information in a one-on-one basis. Some information may be
conveyed by other media, such as video tapes, web sites, and other inter-
active media.46 In the medical arena, some studies show that patients
Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus
Conmunity-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1693 (1997) (citing Irshad Abdal-Haqq
& Qadir Abdal-Haqq, Community-Based Arbitration as a Vehicle for Implementing Islamic Law
in the United States, I J. ISLAMIC L. 61 (1996)); see also Freshman, supra at 1743 (citing JAMES
YAFFE, SO SUE ME! THE STORY OF A COMMUNITY COURT (1972) (discussing Jewish arbitration));
see also ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN, JEWISH JUSTICE AND CONCILIATION: HISTORY OF THE JEWISH
CONCILIATION BOARD, 1930-1968 (1981).
43. Freshman, supra note 42, at 1759 (discussing both how communities may look to
community dispute resolution to strengthen "the" community and how such community-
enhancing mediation may be problematic because it enhances and even elevates one kind of
potential community at the expense of other real or potential communities).
44. See Mikel v. Scharf, 432 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (declining to enforce the
submission of a commercial leasing dispute submitted to Jewish court for arbitration).
45. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Courthouse and Other Possibilities, 13 OHIO ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 303, 320-21 (1998).
46. Merely requiring an arbitration agreement to be conspicuous does not guarantee
that it will be understood; neither does a signature requirement. While a
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may better understand the potential benefits and risks of some treatments
when they see videos rather than when they meet with professionals in
person.47 Even if individuals must convey information and answer ques-
tions, this may be done-at least in part-in classes or seminars. In
some mediation programs, for example, those referred to mediation must
first attend a seminar with many other persons on the basic process of
mediation. 8
Likewise, it is easy to worry that individual entities will not have
the time to adequately consider different varieties of arbitration. Per-
haps entities are too busy with other considerations."9 Perhaps some
entities simply cannot focus on so many choices without getting emo-
tionally upset.50 These concerns, too, should not be exaggerated. Even
if some parties are too busy, overwhelmed, powerless, and so on, to
discuss arbitration, other parties in similar situations may have the time,
emotional stability, and bargaining power to press for different kinds of
arbitration. In at least some circumstances, the arbitration agreements
such parties craft may become the models for others.5" In particular,
when such parties identify arbitration agreements that simply create
more value, such as reducing overall costs by providing for an amount
of discovery sufficient to settle a case without a full hearing, such provi-
sions may benefit others in other situations. As in any situation where
law permits parties to bargain, there also remains a danger that more
powerful parties bargain for provisions that instead allow them a greater
chance of success-effectively claiming the probability of value.52
requirement that lawyers also sign may be too onerous, a "notice provision"
explaining some of the basic distinctions between court trial and arbitration and
providing a ready means of obtaining more information might be a meaningful
compromise.
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 831, 897.
47. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, YALE L.J., 899, 937-38 (1994).
48. Frances Butler, Questions that Lead to Answers in Child Custody Mediation, in WHEN
TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 17, 22 (Deborah M. Kolb ed., 1994).
49. Cf CHARLES S. CARVER & MICHAEL F. SCHEIER, ON THE SELF-REGULATION OF
BEHAVIOR 130-31 (1998) (noting that at times individuals may be juggling many different
commitments and may simply "coast" when they are doing well enough on one project).
50. See generally Sheena S. lyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can
One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHoL. 995 (2000) (noting that
some people experience anxiety and decrease in satisfaction when they have many choices).
51. Cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (providing that
personal service is not required where "[tihe individual interest does not stand alone but is
identical with that of a class," and where "notice reasonably certain to reach most of those
interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all, since any objections sustained
would inure to the benefit of all").
52. See generally, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000) (stating that negotiation often involves both the
creation of value that may benefit all parties and the claiming of some share of value by particular
parties); Clark Freshman et al., The Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We Know and
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To review, then, conveying information about arbitration raises a
number of complicated questions. Some of these may well involve
questions of degree: how many features does one describe, or how many
different sources of information, or how many different options? The
answer to some of these questions may well vary with particular circum-
stances. For example, given the advances of technology, one might
think that an attorney or other person should be expected to offer more
information and more explanations. Or, perhaps, an individual could be
expected to offer more information about topics that seemed to matter
more to the individual decision-maker. To some degree, too, the kind of
information and the extent of information will vary depending on deeper
questions of why we value autonomy. The next section presents rela-
tively theoretical alternatives about such values, and the remaining sec-
tion present more practical problems-and potential solutions-for
many different kinds of informed consent.
B. Concepts of Autonomy in Arbitration
We now turn to more theoretical questions about the value of
autonomy and informed consent. In the context of informed consent and
arbitration, one can identify at least four principal kinds of autonomy.
These four reflect the interaction of two distinct questions: First, should
we look at autonomy only as a means towards an end of some version of
economic efficiency or from some other intrinsic commitment, such as
respect for an individual's dignity, or for the development of certain
capacities,53 like the capacity for deliberative judgment? Second, should
we look at autonomy merely from an individual's perspective or from a
perspective that includes some larger body, be it a community, the state,
nation, or world society?
1. Alternative Concepts of Autonomy
The first concept of autonomy is individual efficiency autonomy.
This involves a narrow focus on economic consequences and a narrow
focus on the individual. Individual efficiency simply looks to what kind
of information is relevant for an individual to make efficient decisions
about his express preferences.54 Will I win more or less in arbitration?
Don't Know About How Mood Relates to Successful Negotiation, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 20
(reviewing evidence that people in simulated negotiations often overlook the chance to create
value).
53. See Schuck, supra note 47, at 900 (1994) ("To say that one cannot be bound by a promise
that one did not voluntarily and knowingly make is to say that the individual should be the author
of her own undertakings, that a genuine respect for her dignity requires a broad deference to her
choices."). "[C]onsent is instrumental to economic efficiency." Id. at 901.
54. For expository purposes, I am presenting a relatively cramped version of efficiency.
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Will I save money? Will it be faster? This is the kind of narrow version
of autonomy often recognized by tort law: Would the failure to give
certain information have made a difference in some outcome that can be
tied to a dollar figure? Even within this narrow paradigm, however,
there will still be occasions when autonomy means questioning what an
entity says it wants. For example, some may say that they want arbitra-
tion because it is faster, and a competent attorney might correct such a
misunderstanding (in those circumstances when it is not accurate).55 Or
a party may say they do not want arbitration because they want not
merely an award but some guidance on what a contract means, and the
attorney might note that arbitration can be customized in many instances
to involve written opinions and even judicial review.56 In most cases,
however, the notion of individual efficient autonomy will call for rela-
tively little information and relatively little deliberation.
The second closely related concept of autonomy is socially efficient
autonomy. Here, too, the relevant consideration is confined to things
that might make a difference in some relatively narrow economic way,
but includes consideration not just of parties but of a larger body, such
as society. A paradigm example is the question of "compliance." The
socially efficient version of autonomy would be concerned if people felt
they were so uninformed about arbitration that they failed to abide by
arbitration awards and/or contested them in court in ways that consumed
public resources, like court time. As studies of the psychology of proce-
dural justice suggest, people may be very quickly satisfied when there
has been any discussion, even if one may criticize the outcome of the
discussion. 7 Therefore, this socially efficient version of autonomy
might well call for relatively little information and relatively little
discussion.58
Since what is efficient depends on what one specifies as one's sources of utility, one can easily
imagine a concept of efficiency that expands to cover a far wider range. If an individual derived
utility from consideration of wider values, such as deliberating about many choices, and learning
more about choices, then individual efficient autonomy would collapse into broader notions of
autonomy.
55. See supra text accompanying note 25 (discussing the controversy about whether
arbitration is faster and cheaper).
56. See supra text accompanying note 16.
57. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 9 (discussing problem of how to interpret tendency of
individuals to express satisfaction with certain processes regardless of outcome).
58. On the other hand, the focus on societal consequences might call for more scrutiny of
arbitration for reasons other than autonomy; the societal perspective might well concern itself with
making certain arbitrators follow the law, at least to enforce some important public values. See
supra text accompanying note 16 (discussing greater scrutiny by some courts of arbitral awards).
Likewise, a societal perspective might focus on how well arbitration served to deter future
wrongdoing. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25 (noting that efficiency of arbitration
should include not just cost savings in individual cases but whether arbitration in a set of cases
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The third concept of individual self-development is a far richer
notion of autonomy. This notion is not simply concerned with answer-
ing specific questions about arbitration or in addressing the express val-
ues that someone articulates. Instead, individual self-development seeks
to expose a person to alternatives so thoroughly that we may confidently
say an individual's decision reflects the individual's considered judg-
ment and not merely a choice based on a cramped sense of possibilities.
Left at that, the notion of autonomy might be simply autonomy as dig-
nity, reflecting a concern that an individual be informed because the
individual is an individual.5 9 A richer variant might go further: the pro-
cess of exposing an entity to such a process may be not merely to iden-
tify the best choice in a particular instance. Instead, the process also
reflects a commitment to the development of certain capacities for delib-
erative judgment. This often requires engaging a person in difficult
questions that may not increase utility in the short-run-or even in the
long-run.60 Rather than seeking happiness, this concept of autonomy
seeks to develop a person so the person's life is intrinsically more valua-
ble. In popular culture terms, it is less Nike's "Just do it!" and more
Woody Allen hand-wringing. 6' This stronger notion of individual self-
development will generally be more appropriate when the entities
involved are individuals and less appropriate when the entities are
organizations.
The fourth concept of autonomy is citizen self-development. Like
the notion of individual self-development, it does not seek to promote
informed consent for the sake of happiness but rather based on the
development of certain capacities in themselves. Unlike the individual
variant, however, the focus is not on an individual's development as an
individual but an individual's development as part of some commu-
leads to more or less cases being filed, and the mix of relatively frivolous versus relatively
meritorious cases).
59. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE
L.J. 1129 (1983).
60. Cf, e.g., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Comprehensive Scores and Summary of Interview
Results, in THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 468, 482 (Max Horkheimer & Samuel H.
Flowerman eds., 1950).
It is only when conflicts, shortcomings, and unacceptable impulses are frankly faced
that their mastery may be furthered to the point of perfection and the maximum
potential for dealing adequately with varying conditions may be achieved.
Temporarily, however, such frankness may well lead to increased anxieties and
depressions, and some contestants may, for better or for worse, be left by the way.
Id.
61. Apart from the particular end of developing this individual capacity, there might be values
to autonomy to develop other capacities or for other intrinsic ends.
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nity.62 This means that the consideration of choices for some kinds of
communities will be far more cramped than individual self-develop-
ment. Some communities will not want an individual to think about
arbitration in ways that lead her away from the community. For exam-
ple, those who favor Islamic arbitration to preserve Islamic culture
would likely not want to expose Islamic women to ideas about arbitra-
tion that might be organized not along the community of Muslims but
instead along a community of women.63 In principle at least, one might
imagine societies so thoroughly individualistic that citizen self-develop-
ment would collapse into individual self-development.64 As with the
stronger version of individual self-development, this stronger version of
citizen self-development may be more appropriate when the entities
involved are individuals.
2. Implications of Concepts of Autonomy
The various concepts of autonomy have several implications for
how we think about informed consent. At least two kinds of implica-
tions roughly correspond to their two dimensions. First, the more one
wants autonomy to develop the capacities of individuals-either for her
own development or for some part of society-one will want to devote
more resources in terms of time and money to informed consent. By
extension, this may also mean that one will also be more willing to com-
promise other interests that may conflict with this kind of autonomy.
For example, to the extent that the privacy of arbitration inhibits auton-
62. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENTS (1996) (arguing that
individuals should be more engaged in debate about the ends of society).
63. Freshman, supra note 42, at 1754 (noting that Islamic community arbitration would
"[p]rovide a forum for clarifying and establishing Islamic values"). As I have suggested
elsewhere, this is a general failure of community-enhancing dispute resolution: it enhances the ties
of an individual to one kind of community rather than to another (real or potential) community or
individual value. See Freshman, supra note 42, at 1757-60. Others, however, imply we may only
exercise autonomy in the context of some kind of community. CHARLES TAYLOR, THE POLITICS
OF RECOGNITION 34 (1992).
Thus my discovering my own identity doesn't mean that I work it out in isolation,
but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others.
That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new
importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical
relations with others.
Id. Some critical race theorists make similar points. John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory,
Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2195 (1992) (criticizing the idea of "the voice of a distinct individual,
one separated in an operational sense from colored community, culture and peoplehood")
(emphasis added).
64. Cf Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L.
Rev. 1001 (1983) (arguing that some religious communities place greater emphasis on
individual's consideration and commitment to religion and others place greater emphasis on faith
itself).
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omy, 65 one will be more willing to expand public access to information
about particular arbitrations. Second, to the extent that one favors indi-
vidual autonomy, one will want to make greater efforts to make sure that
individuals know about different providers of arbitration and different
options for naming individual arbitrators. By extension, an individualist
would consider ways to enhance the ability of an individual to shift com-
mitments to different communities. For example, one might limit the
ability of someone to identify arbitrators from a particular commercial or
ethnic community. Or, in a less radical way, one might sunset such
provisions: an agreement to arbitrate future disputes before, say, Islamic
arbitrators, would not be enforceable for more than ten years.66 Third, to
the extent one favors various kinds of public-oriented autonomy one
would also develop ways to encourage individuals to consider choices
about arbitration more seriously. Where a purely individual orientation
might, for example, encourage attorneys only to discuss arbitration so
long as the entity expresses some interest, a broader orientation would
encourage the attorney to discuss issues even when the entity expressed
little interest-and perhaps even when the entity said it was quite satis-
fied with the type of arbitration or other dispute resolution under
consideration.
II. WHAT AUTONOMY WILL THE MARKET PROMOTE?
Once we have seen the various ways one might inform entities
about arbitration, and once we have seen how these ways may differ
according to different theoretical goals, it is worth exploring the kind of
autonomy that existing market forces may promote. After all, as Ste-
phen Ware has argued elsewhere, if a relatively unregulated market for
65. As discussed later, privacy is a difficult case for autonomy. See infra text accompanying
notes 136-40. On the one hand, one key aspect of autonomy may be the right to be left alone,
including the right to resolve one's disputes in a private and secret forum. On the other hand, to
the extent I resolve my disputes in private, I deny your ability to make informed choices about
disputes based on how various private fora actually resolve disputes. For example, I may well
want to know whether private justice really involves compromise awards, see text accompanying
note 26 supra, but I will not get this information as readily if you hide what happened in your
arbitration.
66. As with privacy, the commitment to communities also involves a complicated tradeoff. In
part, my autonomy may include my ability to bind myself in the future; autonomy may also
include the ability to identify with certain communities. These two considerations favor allowing
me to commit to resolve my disputes before a particular community-now and in the future. On
the other hand, autonomy may also include a commitment to the ability to change over some
relevant range. Mill famously identified the easy case: my autonomy cannot include my ability to
sell myself into slavery. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 152-53 (Edward Alexander ed.,
Broadview Press 1999) (1869). For more recent analyses in terms of concepts of future selves,
see infra text accompanying notes 108-11. Arbitration raises difficult intermediate cases: for how
long may I commit to resolve my disputes before a particular community?
[Vol. 56:909
TWEAKING THE MARKET FOR AUTONOMY
arbitration services will deliver better legal decisions-and indeed even
development of more efficient legal rules! 67-then there may be little
need to tinker with the status quo. On the other hand, the more that
existing market forces may diverge from the kinds of autonomy we
value, the more that some tweaking of market conditions may be
appropriate.
A story by Hart and Sacks illustrates the promise and limit of the
market for autonomy in arbitration:
Within broad limits... private parties who submit an existing dispute
to arbitration may write their own ticket about the terms of submis-
sion if they can agree to a ticket. [The authors refer to an old story
about a person who, in a dream, was threatened by an ominous char-
acter and who asked, tremulously, "What are you going to do
now?"-only to receive the answer, "How do I know? This is your
dream."] The arbitration of an existing dispute is the parties' dream,
and they can make it what they want it to be.6 8
As an abstraction, the dream story suggests that individuals exercise
autonomy in arbitration as much as they like. If they only asked about
how to modify arbitration, they might get it; if they forget to ask, it must
not matter that much. Moreover, if individuals would be happy with the
information, we would expect the market to promote information. Par-
ticularly when lawyers bill by the hour, one would expect lawyers to be
more than happy to offer such information. And yet, as we will see, the
autonomy that arbitration promotes may be limited by the capabilities
and incentives of all market actors: individual parties involved in arbitra-
tion, attorneys, and providers of arbitration services.
A. Limits on Participant Incentives
The account of autonomy presented in the dream scenario above at
best fulfills the potential of individual efficient autonomy. It does little
to satisfy us that a person has made choices based on an informed con-
sideration of alternatives. A person may not know what to make of his
"dream" of arbitration because he does not know about various alterna-
tives. By analogy, it is telling that consumers exposed to greater infor-
mation about professional choices in other areas, do want to ask
additional questions. Patients who have more access to medical infor-
mation, via such sources as the Internet, ask more questions. 69
The danger of knowing too little to even ask is particularly striking
67. See Ware, supra note 3, at 703.
68. MURRAY ET AL., supra note 24, at 691 (quoting HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS 310 (1994)).
69. Christine Wiebe, Doctors Swept Up by Connected Consumers, available at www.
medscape.com/home/moneyMedicine/medscapreArticles/ehealth.html (last visited Dec. 12, 1999).
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with procedural choices generally, not just discussion of arbitration.
Teachers of civil procedure regularly complain that first year law stu-
dents have no basis in their lives for thinking about procedural choices.7"
For example, studies show that many individuals do not know that car
dealers typically will negotiate with purchasers about the price of a car.
This is particularly troublesome, too, because the lack of information
may correspond to other kinds of disadvantages: African-Americans, for
example, are less familiar with this ability to negotiate than others.7'
(Of course, to some extent, this may actually reflect correct knowledge
about different information; as Ian Ayres has shown, dealers in fact
spend more time negotiating with African-American men, which may
mean that African-American men pay a higher cost in terms of wasted
time).72 At least when an individual knows something about a topic, the
individual may ask questions and learn even if she gets no answers. The
refusal of a dealer to discuss car history itself conveys information about
its history; so, too, the refusal of a car dealer to discuss why a contract
specifies one arbitration provider rather than another may raise ques-
tions. It therefore becomes plausible that even drafters of take-it-or-
leave-it arbitration provisions will disclose some relevant information
about arbitration when they suspect people already know something
about arbitration.73 On the other hand, when many individuals little
understand arbitration, it is far easier for arbitration simply to go
undiscussed.
B. Limits on Lawyer Incentives
Existing market conditions give lawyers74 little incentive to discuss
70. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 2-3 (5th ed. 2000); Martha L. Fineman,
Unmythological Procedure, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 141, 149 (1989) (arguing that Civil Procedure is
difficult without any understanding of the systematic interrelationship between different
procedural choices).
71. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 79 (noting that sixty-one percent of African-Americans believed the
sticker price of a car was not negotiable while only thirty-one percent of whites thought so).
72. Id. at 38.
73. Suppose the seller refused to assist the buyer in securing a particular piece of
information that the seller already had. If the information could have either a
positive or negative value on the buyer's evaluation of the worth of the business, a
rational buyer would infer from the seller's refusal to cooperate that the information
must be unfavorable. Thus, the seller has little incentive to withhold the
information.
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE
L.J. 239, 270 (1984).
74. In some instances, nonlawyers may be advocates in arbitration. This is historically quite
common in arbitration involving union disputes. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY:
LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 151 (1998) (noting that arbitration of labor grievances
"regularly pits experienced nonlawyer advocates against experienced lawyer advocates").
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arbitration thoroughly. Instead, as suggested further in the next section,
the lawyer may assume a client has such a negative view of litigation
and such a cramped view of alternatives that any kind of arbitration will
exceed the client's expectations. In addition, existing applications of
ethics rules and malpractice law do not provide much of an incentive
either. Ethics rules do not clearly address whether the choice of arbitra-
tion properly falls to the lawyer as a tactical question or to the client."
For its part, tort law provides little incentive because it only permits a
client to recover if it may show that some advice regarding the arbitra-
tion would have led to a different result.7 6 A client may not recover in
tort merely by showing that further discussion of alternatives would
have furthered her autonomy.
Another large limit on market incentives involves principal-agent
problems. For both individuals and organizations, there will be gaps in
information and power between those affected by decisions and those
empowered to make decisions. In organizations, in-house counsel may
often make decisions about the choice of procedures, including how to
use arbitration. Managers, employees, shareholders, and others affected
by the decision may have little say in such a decision. Moreover, such
other stakeholders may not even realize that there may have been
choices at all. Instead, in-house counsel may respond to their own
career incentives in picking types of dispute resolution. In-house coun-
sel; for example, may respond to the way they are evaluated for staying
within budget in a particular year or avoiding large verdicts that attract
attention.77 Other stakeholders, however, may be more concerned with a
longer time frame and/or aggregate effects on profitability. For individ-
uals, the problem may often involve the role of insurance in litigation.
As Gross and Syverud have shown, a large share of litigation by "indi-
viduals" is financed and (nearly always) controlled by insurers.78 Here,
insurers may well value the speed and privacy of arbitration, because it
may set limited precedential value, but individuals may prefer the possi-
bility of public vindication of trial.7 9
75. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 4, at 784-85; Freshman, supra note 42, at 1771; see
generally Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client Control:
Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow Client to Control Negotiation and Pursue
Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990).
76. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 75, at 873.
77. See generally Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the
Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OIo ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 831, 842-44 (1998).
78. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991).
79. Id. at 361-63 (discussing that because physicians stand to lose their reputation, "[miany
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C. Limits on Incentives of Arbitration Providers
If individual lawyers have little incentive to discuss different kinds
of arbitration, what about the incentive for providers of arbitration? At
any given time, providers will want to "inform" individuals about alter-
natives that make the alternatives they provide' seem most valuable. In
principle, at least those who provide arbitration, such as the American
Arbitration Association, JAMS, or other organizations and individuals,
should have an incentive to develop better accounts of arbitration. In
practice, however, competition may be limited for several reasons. First,
individuals may reasonably place a high value on experience and stabil-
ity of arbitration providers. Existing institutions have a special advan-
tage in this area. Many commitments to arbitration are embodied in
long-standing contracts, and disputes arising out of such agreements will
continue to go to such providers. Second, one might imagine that indi-
viduals may modify such contracts, but market signaling makes that dif-
ficult. Raising a question about a dispute resolution provision in a long-
standing contract may raise suspicions about the prospect of future liti-
gation.8" Third, to the extent that providers do compete, they may com-
pete in a race to the bottom in services offered to repeat players rather
than a race to the best information about the process to less experienced
parties.8 '
Though seemingly an exception to this description, the recent adop-
tion of the due process protocols confirms some of the combined limita-
tions of lawyer and provider incentives. As recounted in detail
elsewhere, lawyers for plaintiffs threatened to veto many arbitration
providers if they did not do more to provide for fair arbitrations. In
response, various providers agreed to limitations on arbitration of
employment and consumer disputes.82 In many ways, these rules are
very significant in reducing the potential of bias in arbitration. At the
same time, the rules are most explicit in addressing the potential for
professional liability insurance policies sold to physicians in the United States require the consent
of the physician to any nonzero settlement ... and will likely insist that the case be tried").
80. See infra text accompanying note 105.
81. Consider one particularly harsh indictment of the American Arbitration Association:
When the American Arbitration Association was the only national provider of ADR
services, it honorably fulfilled the role assigned to it in its bylaws of educating the
public and administering arbitration, mediation and other "voluntary" forms of
dispute resolution. But in recent years, when confronted with competition from "for-
profit" competitors, AAA appears to have abandoned its public service, nonprofit
mission and transformed itself into a new corporation that markets "do it yourself
tort reform" instead of neutrality.
Cliff Palefsky, The CPR-Georgetown Ethical Principles for ADR Providers Only a Start ARA
Provider Ethics Principles Don't Go Far Enough, 7 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 18, 20 (2001).
82. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25, at 42-48.
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economic consequences: the rules try to make fair substantive outcomes
more likely by such things as providing for some discovery and some
limits on bias of arbitrators.83 It is true that the rules also make some
reference to informing individuals about the nature of arbitration. These
rules, however, are significantly more general and less detailed.84 Per-
haps these more general rules reflect some notion that there may be
many ways to provide such relevant information. On the other hand,
such less detailed rules may well reflect the market incentives of lawyers
described above: the lawyers who threatened a boycott if there were no
due process protocols want to make sure that their clients do well-
particularly when they get paid on a contingency basis-and may be less
concerned that the individual understand other aspects of arbitration.
III. BARRIERS TO PROMOTING AUTONOMY
As we have seen, market actors only have very limited incentives to
promote autonomy. The market for arbitration also falls short of pro-
moting autonomy for a second set of reasons. Even if market actors
tried to engage in more nuanced and deliberative conversations with
entities about choices about arbitration, there would be additional barri-
ers in getting entities to understand arbitration sufficiently. To put these
barriers in perspective, however, we need to sift some easily exaggerated
barriers from more troublesome barriers.
A. Easily Exaggerated Barriers
Discussions of informed consent in arbitration and more generally
in academic scholarship often exaggerate barriers to promoting auton-
83. American Arbitration Association Dispute Resolution Services Worldwide, Rules and
Procedures, available at http:I/www.adr.org/index2. I.jspJSPssid= 13137&JSPsrc=upload\
LIVESITE\RulesProcedures\NationalInternational\. .\. .\focusArea\commercial\AAA235-
0900.htm#R-33(discussing discovery provisions under rule 33); http://www.adr.org/index2.I.jsp?
JSPssid=13137&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESTIE\RulesProcedures\NationalInternational\. .\. .\
focusArea\commercial\AAA235-0900.htm#R-19 (last visited June 1, 2002) (discussing disclosure
and limit on bias under rule 19).
84. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Consumer Due Process Protocol (1998), available
at http://www.law.du.edu/dauer/ADR%20Spring%202002/5D-6_AAAProtocol.doc. The Proto-
col provides in part:
PRINCIPLE 2. AccEss To INFORMATION REGARDING ADR PROGRAM-Providers of
goods or services should undertake reasonable measures to provide Consumers with
full and accurate information regarding Consumer ADR Programs. At the time the
Consumer contracts for goods or services, such measures should include (1) clear
and adequate notice regarding the ADR provisions, including a statement indicating
whether participation in the ADR Program is mandatory or optional, and (2)
reasonable means by which Consumers may obtain additional information regarding
the ADR Program. After a dispute arises, Consumers should have access to all
information necessary for effective participation in ADR.
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omy. In the most specific instance, doctrinal approaches often do not
look closely enough at existing state regulations before concluding that
there is some larger problem with federal arbitration law. At a more
general level, some academic approaches in economics and psychology
more generally exaggerate the difficulties of providing information and
overlook some potential benefits.
1. Exaggerated Doctrinal Limits: Room for State Regulation
Conventional understanding teaches that any state attempts to
advise entities about what arbitration entails are entirely preempted by
federal law. And at first blush, this interpretation has much support. In
the best known example, the Supreme Court struck down a Montana law
that required that arbitration clauses be placed in bold print on the first
page of a contract.8 5
On close examination, however, existing state regulations often
really are not about informed consent, so much as one-sided warnings
about arbitration. A number of statutes appear designed simply to alert
people to the presence of an arbitration clause. These statutes
impose some combination of requirements that arbitration clauses
appear on the first page of a contract,86  in capital letters,87
85. See generally Doctor's Ass'n v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
86. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(b) (Michie 1988) (requiring that any agreement to arbitrate
supplied by a health care provider and executed before medical treatment is provided clearly
provide in bold print on the face of the agreement that execution of the agreement by the patient is
not prerequisite to receiving care or treatment); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982)
(requiring that any contract for medical services which contains a provision for arbitration of any
dispute as to professional negligence of a health care provider have such provision as the first
article of the contract); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing that notice
that a contract is subject to arbitration shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page
of the contract) (holding preempted as to arbitration affecting interstate commerce by Munoz v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 542 S.E. 2d 360 (2001)).
87. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.865 (Baldwin 1984) (providing that in order for the
informal dispute resolution system, offered by a motor vehicle manufacturer to a buyer, to be
binding on both parties the written agreement whereby the dispute is submitted to the system must
include a notice in conspicuous capital letters and bold-faced type reminding the buyer that by
entering into the agreement he is deciding to use the dispute resolution system to settle his
dispute); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.02 (1997) (requiring that any standardized agreement in
which binding arbitration is the sole remedy for dispute resolution contain the following statement
in capitalized, underlined type adjoining the signature block: "THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS
AN ARBITRATION PROVISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES"); CAL.
Bus. PROF. CODE ANN. § 1298 (West 1994) (providing that when a provision for binding
arbitration is included in a contract to convey real property or in a contract between principals and
agents in real property sales transactions, it shall be set out in capital letters when the provision is
included in a typed contract); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing that
notice that a contract is subject to arbitration shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first
page of the contract) (holding preempted as to cases affecting interstate commerce by Munoz v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 542 S.E. 2d 360 (2001)).
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in bold88 or underlined type,89 or even in a separate document or a sepa-
rately initialed or signed provision of the same document.9° One might
read requirements that a person's attorney sign an arbitration clause as a
variation: the assumption may be that the attorney will explain the provi-
sion to the client-or at least assume responsibility if she fails to do so
adequately. 9' The warnings are not just one-sided in the sense of flag-
88. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982) (requiring that in any contract for medical
services which contains a provision for arbitration there appear a notice in at least ten-point bold
red type informing the patient that by signing the contract he is agreeing to have issues of
malpractice decided by arbitration); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-a (McKinney 1986)
(requiring that arbitration election notices provided by health maintenance organizations to
enrollees contain a provision in at least twelve-point boldface type which puts the enrollee on alert
that by signing that form he is agreeing to have any issue of alleged health care malpractice
decided by neutral arbitrator); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-3 (Michie 1976) (requiring that
arbitration agreements between hospitals or physicians and patients contain a provision in twelve-
point boldface type putting the patient on alert that by signing the contract he is giving up his fight
to a court trial); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1298 (West 1994) (providing that when a provision
for binding arbitration is included in a printed contract to convey real property or in a printed
contract between principals and agents in real property sales transactions, it shall be set out in at
least eight-point bold type); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403 (West 1997) (requiring that any
agreement for the provision of medical services which has a provision for binding arbitration
contain a notice in at least ten-point, boldface type putting the patient on alert that by signing the
agreement he is agreeing to have any issue of medical malpractice decided by neutral binding
arbitration); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(b) (Michie 1988) (requiring that any agreement to
arbitrate supplied by a health care provider and executed before medical treatment is provided
clearly state in bold print on the face of the agreement that execution of the agreement by the
patient is not prerequisite to receiving care or treatment).
89. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.02 (1997) (requiring that any standardized
agreement in which binding arbitration is the sole remedy for dispute resolution contain the
following statement in capitalized, underlined type adjoining the signature block: "THIS
CONTRACT CONTAINS AN ARBITRATION PR6VISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED
BY THE PARTIES"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing that notice that
a contract is subject to arbitration shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of
the contract).
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302 (1955) (requiring that in contracts relating to farm property,
structures or goods, or to property and structures utilized as a residence of a party, arbitration
clauses be signed or initialed by the parties); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.865 (1984) (providing
that before a dispute between a buyer and a car manufacturer may be submitted to an informal
dispute resolution system which is legally binding on both parties, the buyer shall sign the
disclosure contained in the parties' written agreement to arbitrate their dispute, which reminds him
that by using the dispute resolution system he is giving up his right to go to court); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 5652 (1985) (providing that an agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable unless
accompanied by a written acknowledgment of arbitration signed by each of the parties); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-2 (Harrison 1988) (requiring that an arbitration clause in any employment contract or
in any sales agreement for the purchase of residential real estate be initialed by all signatories in
order to be enforceable).
91. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 4590i (Vernon 1993) (providing that no physician,
professional association of physicians, or other health care provider shall request or require a
patient to execute an agreement to arbitrate a health care liability claim unless the form of
agreement delivered to the patient contains the following written notice: "UNDER TEXAS LAW,
THIS AGREEMENT IS INVALID AND OF NO LEGAL EFFECT UNLESS IT IS ALSO
SIGNED BY AN AT7ORNEY OF YOUR OWN CHOOSING..."); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
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ging only issues involving arbitration; as we saw above, they also speak
only in terms of what one loses in arbitration-such as losing a right to
appeals or jury trials. The statutes mention nothing about potential
advantages of arbitration, such as potentially greater speed, privacy,
informality, and expertise.92
These cases about one-sided warnings tell us very little about how
much room states would have to make more balanced and accurate
warnings, like those suggested in the next section. I have identified no
state statute that attempts to describe arbitration in balanced terms that
compare it with other alternatives. The closest kind of provision is a
requirement by a small number of states that attorneys discuss alterna-
tives to litigation in certain cases with their clients. 93 Because the warn-
ings generally considered by state courts are currently not balanced,
there is to ponder that the Supreme Court might allow more balanced
warnings by states.94 In addition, under some recent case law, some
courts may allow even the unbalanced warnings if the contract at
issue-even if not the arbitration clause itself-includes a choice of
state law. 95 Furthermore, apart from whether the Supreme Court would
allow more balanced warnings by states, there remains the possibility
that federal legislation, too, could adopt more balanced descriptions.
2. Exaggerated Theoretical Limits: Inevitability vs. Opportunity
Apart from doctrine, many scholars of decision-making also exag-
gerate barriers to informed consent. After surveying some limits on
informed decision-making similar to those discussed below, some schol-
CODE ANN. § 172.001 (Vernon 1997) (providing that an arbitration provision in a consumer
contract for $50,000 or less is unenforceable unless signed by consumer's attorney).
92. An open question would be whether those drafting the disclosures required by the state
might also add in additional descriptions of potential benefits. While the statutes themselves do
not purport to prohibit such additional descriptions on their face, a party including such
descriptions might fear a court would not enforce a provision. Cf Engalla v. Permanente Med.
Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (refusing to enforce arbitration provision on ground that
hospital perpetrated a fraud by describing arbitration as faster when, as run by the hospital, it
typically took longer than court).
93. See supra text accompanying note 91; see generally Cochran, supra note 75.
94. Some legal realists might question whether Supreme Court jurisprudence might really be
less about careful consideration of competing policies than simply a results-oriented attempt to
send everything possible to arbitration. While this might be a plausible interpretation of some
earlier Supreme Court cases, the Court has shown a willingness to uphold limitations in arbitration
in at least two recent cases. See Kaplan v. First Options, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (holding that a case
could not go to arbitration until a court, not an arbitrator, decided that the matter was intended to
go to arbitration); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
475-79 (1989) (upholding the stay of an arbitration because there was a routine choice of
California law clause, and California law gave state judges discretion to stay arbitration when
there was related court action involving another party).
95. Rau, supra note 2, at 249-50.
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ars abandon hope of letting individuals make informed choices and
instead suggest further government regulation.96 An alternative path,
however, involves trying to develop different procedures for enhancing
decision-making. This is a general feature of scholarship on psychologi-
cal processes: some people identify a certain kind of feature and label it
as an immutable failure of human nature. Some evolutionary psychol-
ogy scholarship too quickly assumes certain traits are "hardwired" into
our brains. 97
Instead, one could adopt a problem-solving approach to develop
certain better kinds of faculties by individuals,98 identifying different
processes that will enhance individual decision-making. Civilization,
after all, is not about giving into our first instincts, but rather learning
how to better tap some, such as creativity and diligence, and tame
others, such as anger and violence. 99 Likewise, as we have seen with the
development of interactive technology, one can develop better technol-
ogy to make informed decision-making more effective and more afford-
able. In other words, barriers are not anchors for some inevitable
necessity but rather markers for the opportunity for creative ways to
build a civilization that overcomes such barriers.
Likewise, economic theory sometimes emphasizes the costs of
information without emphasizing the potential benefits of further infor-
mation. This problem illustrates part of a more general problem with
attempts to think about the efficient consideration of information. At a
high level of generality, economics understands that there are costs to
searching for information, conveying information, and considering
96. See, e.g., Russel Korobkifi, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999).
97. See generally, e.g., TERRY BURNHAM & JAY PHELAN, MEAN GENES: FROM SEX TO
MONEY TO FooD, TAMING OUR PRIMAL INSTINCTS (2000) (describing the genetic predisposition to
many aspects of behavior, but noting individuals still have room to affect outcomes by changing
their behavior).
98. Id. at 10-11 ("The twig of human nature is indeed bent from the start. [But i]t must be
seduced, not bullied, into behaving.").
99. Consider Bentham's (racist) description of how civilization tames the desire for revenge:
An Indian receives an injury, real or imaginary, from an Indian of another tribe. He
revenges it upon the person of his antagonist with the most excruciating torments:
the case being, that cruelties inflicted on such an occasion gain him reputation in his
own tribe. The disposition manifested in such a case can never be deemed a good
one, among a people ever so few degrees advanced, in point of civilization, above
the Indians.
Jeremy Bentham, Elements of Human Disposition, in BENTHAMIANA OR SELECT EXTRACTS FROM
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 13 (1998); AARON T. BECK, PRISONERS OF HATE: THE
COGNITIVE BASIS OF ANGER, HOSTILITY, AND VIOLENCE 292-93 (1999) ("There is no evidence
that people have a 'need' for opponents or enemies. Misperceiving others as enemies is a
cognitive problem.").
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information. 00 (Some psychologists and legal theorists make similar
points in arguing for the "need" to make decisions based on some kind
of stereotypes and generalizations rather than more information). 1 '
Economics and psychology have a harder time modeling the benefits of
more information and deliberation. Even if we focus narrowly on util-
ity, it may be efficient to engage someone about the possibilities of tink-
ering with different kinds of arbitration for a variety of reasons. Perhaps
the person will, after more deliberation and information, fix on an alter-
native that makes him happier. Or, perhaps the individual may reach the
same decision but be more satisfied that the decision is the best
alternative.
B. More Difficult Barriers
Though it is easy to exaggerate barriers to informed decision-mak-
ing, it is important to recognize some very real obstacles.
1. Lack of Experience
The first difficult barrier is the limited experiential capacity of indi-
viduals to imagine different types of dispute resolution. This involves
two kinds of limited experience. First, individuals lack realistic experi-
ence with the court system because of the unrepresentative way in which
the public sees courts in the media. The selection of cases, like the
Simpson trial, is atypical. Moreover, the coverage of litigation itself
does not reflect the realities of litigation. In some ways, coverage exag-
gerates the difficulty of litigation by focusing solely on trials; few would
know from media coverage that judges dispose of many cases by
motion. 102 In other ways, coverage underestimates the difficulty of liti-
gation by giving little sense of the time and money involved in gathering
documents, responding to discovery, and other pretrial activity.' 03
100. The making of decisions is costly, and not simply because it is an activity which
some people find unpleasant. In order to make a decision one requires information,
and the new information must be analyzed. The costs of searching for information
and of applying the information to a new situation are such that habit is often a more
efficient way to deal with moderate or temporary changes in the environment than
would be a full, apparently utility-maximizing decision.
George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, AM. EcON. REV., Mar.
1977, at 76, 82.
101. See generally Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social
Science Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different"
Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 396-98 (2001) (arguing that when psychologists label
discrimination as a "normal" cognitive phenomena, this may be misleading and reflect-in part-
responses to the professional incentives of academic psychologists).
102. See supra text accompanying note 24.
103. A rare exception to this rule is the publicity surrounding the pretrial affidavits of Monica
Lewinsky and deposition of President Clinton in his civil trial. Many individuals, however, might
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The experiential distortions are far worse, however, with arbitra-
tion. The case selection is not poor, but virtually non-existent. Arbitra-
tion, even when not secret (in the sense of legally privileged from
access) is often private."°4 This privacy raises a paradox for autonomy.
On the one hand, parties may value private resolution highly; to resolve
disputes privately may be a core exercise of autonomy. On the other
hand, such individually rational decisions raise a collective action prob-
lem. The more that arbitration occurs in private, the less that any indi-
vidual has sufficient experiential knowledge to make an informed
choice.
2. Lack of Future Focus
Even if individuals knew enough about arbitration and court to real-
ize it might matter to some people, a second barrier that may apply is the
limited incentive of individuals to focus on the choice of dispute resolu-
tion. Prior to any particular dispute, individuals may find it hard to con-
template a dispute. Even individuals who know about the frequency of
disputes may find it hard to believe they will become involved in a dis-
pute-much as many couples report knowledge of high divorce rates,
but doubt it will affect them!'0 5 Even when individuals do appreciate
the risk of a dispute, they may fear that discussing possibilities for dis-
pute resolution will signal their potential litigiousness to others. Again,
the problem in exaggerated form involves intimate relations: the person
to raise a premarital agreement often raises doubts about his commit-
ment. 0 6 Organizations may also face similar problems of focus. Even
if a particular firm is a repeat player in disputes, recent empirical
research suggests particular managers and decision-makers within a firm
often will not have experience with disputes. 0 7 Therefore, even when
managers in one decision get involved in disputes, and realize the need
to consider arbitration clauses early, managers in other divisions may
not share this insight.
3. Future Selves and Future Communities
Even if individuals realize the importance of arbitration to their
own transactions, and try to focus on future events, their focus may be
believe the extensive pretrial discovery and motion work reflected the special complications of
litigation involving the President, or perhaps high stakes litigation generally.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 136-39.
105. See, e.g., Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 194 (1998).
106. Id.
107. See generally Rogers & McEwen, supra note 77 (reporting on study of different use of
ADR by several different firms).
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difficult. Individuals often have difficulty thinking about how they, and
those around them, may evolve. This is often associated with the prob-
lem of future selves. 10 8 As I suggested in an earlier article on mediation,
however, the rhetoric of future selves may be needlessly yoked to indi-
vidualist perspectives; we might also wonder about an individual's com-
mitment to future communities as well, including commitments to
communities (such as communities of women) that may not be devel-
oped at a particular point in an individual's life.'0 9 At a particular point
when an individual commits to arbitration, he may indeed make an
informed choice that a particular kind of arbitration better fits his values
than some other type of arbitration, Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR), or the default regime of court. He can be less sure this will be
true when a dispute arises. At that time, there may be a gap through
changes in the individual, the forum for arbitration, or other potential
fora. For example, partners in a law firm might commit to resolve their
disputes by arbitration by partners at other law firms. This originally
may reflect a better match with their needs than litigation. When a dis-
pute finally arises, however, there may have been changes. Perhaps
some law firms have changed, finally including accountants and other
professionals, but our original law firm still restricts itself largely to law-
yers. The firm partners may be disappointed to learn its arbitration may
now involve partners at "other firms" that differ from their own. Or vice
versa: the firm may have evolved to include other professionals, but not
the arbitral forum. Finally-though perhaps least likely-the default
regime of litigation may have evolved, perhaps becoming faster,
cheaper, or more just. (Or, more realistically, it may have evolved spe-
cialized fora to address certain disputes, such as commercial courts, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) forum"o for intellec-
tual property disputes, or the forum for domain name disputes on the
internet). I '
A thought experiment: imagine agreeing in high school that if we
ever have a dispute with anyone, our friends from high school will
resolve it. Our high school selves might very well agree-who has bet-
ter friends, our high school self might think, than now? But our high
108. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY (1979); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 282, 282-93 (1984); Richard A.
Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 26-27 (1997).
109. Freshman, supra note 42, at 1759.
110. World Intellectual Property Organization, Arbitration and Mediation Center, available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/arbitration/arbitration-rules/index.html (last visited May 30, 2002).
111. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Formn and Substance in Cyberspace: Using ICANN
to Route Around tile APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000); see also Stephen J. Ware,
Donain-Nane Arbitration in the Arbitration-LUw Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the
UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 129 (2002).
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school self may be hampered by a lack of experience and a lack of a
sense of possibility. Lack of awareness: people may change. Lack of
sense of possibility: one may discover other friends in the future.
4. Choice Overload
A related objection is the fear of cognitive overload. I think of this
as the New York apartment objection. The New York apartment is
small and only has room for so much; to add more, one has to let some-
thing else out.
This objection can be easily overstated. First, research suggests
that many individuals may only focus on so many things at one time.
Classic research, for example, suggests that individuals can only hold
seven items in short-term memory, though some can hold as few as five,
and some as many as nine.' 2 A simple technical solution to this limita-
tion is dealing with sets of issues in sequence, much as computer hyper-
links allow more information for those interested in particular topics. In
discussing arbitration, for example, individuals might first be exposed to
a number of broad topics and then discover more particular information
on the options that seem most appropriate for them and their particular
set of disputes.
A related objection notes that too many choices lead to anxiety or
lack of satisfaction in some people."I3 While it is important to give
some weight to the psychological consequences of different rules, 1
14
such weight should not preclude any discussion. Instead, it is worth
noting that choice overload plagues some, not all, individuals; namely,
those who feel the need to make perfect decisions. 1I5 In addition, it is
possible that better presentation of choices, or other innovations, might
reduce this overload for such sensitive individuals.
A second related objection is that individuals might focus on arbi-
tration-and might have some ability to negotiate different arbitration
terms, but individuals rationally would rather concentrate on other
terms. For example, if an individual feels he can bargain over only so
many items with a car salesperson, he may find it more rational to bar-
gain for the extra seat mats he knows he will use rather than preserving
some litigation option that would have value only if both: (1) he had
some disputes; and (2) litigation had a different probability of success
112. See, e.g., George Miller, The Magic Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two, 63 PSYCHOL.
REV. 81 (1956).
113. See, e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 50.
114. See generally DENNIS P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW
AS A HELPING PROFESSION (2000) (discussing how legal scholarship, policy, and teaching should
consider therapeutic consequences as one value).
115. See generally lyengar & Lepper, supra note 50.
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than arbitration.' 16
In part, such objections bring us back to the question of the value of
autonomy. Neither objection says that a consumer could not process
information about arbitration, but only that the consumer, considering
only her interests, might be more likely to focus on other kinds of infor-
mation. Richer versions of autonomy, however, may require that an
individual consider more information about arbitration rather than con-
sider seat mats because the public values about developing information
about resolving disputes are more valuable than the seat mats.
5. Market Signaling Barriers
A final set of barriers involves discussing arbitration without sig-
naling to individuals that arbitration is a problem-as opposed to a pro-
cess with some imperfections compared to other institutions with other
imperfections. As we saw above, this difficulty haunts many state
efforts to regulate arbitration.' '" Such state regulations require "disclo-
sures" reminiscent of tobacco labels or Miranda warnings. Partly the
message is the medium: when attorneys mention an "issue," or that a
contract includes a "disclosure," it is easily experienced as a danger and
a problem. Moreover, studies of psychology suggest that such disclo-
sure of rights "waived" will distort decision-making beyond even the
obvious reason that it does not disclose potential benefits gained: indi-
viduals are loss-averse, and they resist making decisions that they expe-
rience as sacrificing something.' 8 Therefore, as we will see in the next
section, adding discussion of advantages and disadvantages to all discus-
sions of procedural choices-including even the choice to stick with the
default regime of litigation-would remove the danger of signaling dis-
cussion of any one option (like arbitration) meant that option was espe-
cially dangerous.
IV. PROMOTING AUTONOMY THROUGH ARBITRATION:
UTOPIAS OF INFORMED CONSENT
As we have seen, there are many reasons to care about informing
individuals more about arbitration, many reasons to supplement the lim-
ited incentives of the market, and many obstacles to conveying informa-
tion-some exaggerated and some more complex. This last section
116. 1 am grateful to my friend, George Lindemann, for suggesting this point when we
discussed negotiating over commercial leases.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 85-92.
118. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 159, 165 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000)
("[C]hanges that make things worse (losses) loom larger than improvements or gains.").
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suggests a number of possibilities. In addition, in the problem-solving
tradition, it invites further discussion of possibilities to explore other
ways to promote informed consent. Just as we earlier saw the limits of
market incentives to convey information and the subsequent barriers to
conveying that information, so too, this section first looks at tweaking
incentives and then overcoming barriers.
A. Incentives
1. Individual Incentives
More empirical research about how individuals already view arbi-
tration would make changing incentives easier to think about. We
should better understand what people know and, to some extent, want to
know, about arbitration. Proponents of arbitration and other forms of
ADR often cling to satisfaction studies that show those who use arbitra-
tion or ADR report more satisfaction than those who go to court. These
satisfaction studies tell us little about autonomy. As many critics of
ADR note, proponents of ADR often engage in false comparisons: an
ideal of ADR versus an imperfect reality of litigation." 9 One study of
arbitration funded by a major arbitration provider reports that fifty-nine
percent of adults would choose to arbitrate becomes eighty-two percent
of adults when they are "informed" about arbitration. 20 That "informa-
tion"?: the "cost [of arbitration] would be 75% less than the cost of a
lawsuit."'' The study does not even purport to provide a citation for
this "information"; nor does it discuss what "information" adults might
have about the range of awards given by arbitrators versus judgments
given by courts.
More useful research might instead study what participants in arbi-
tration thought their alternatives were. We might also compare this
sense of alternatives with what lawyers and others know. For example,
119. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator For?": Mediation's
"Value-Added" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 6 (1996) ("Viewed in proper
perspective, mediation and other third-party processes are alternatives not to court, but to
unassisted settlement efforts ...."); see also Richard L. Abel, Introduction, I POLmCS INFORMAL
JUSTICE 9 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (noting that advocates of "informal justice" deploy various
"rhetorical devices" including "false comparisons," such as when "[m]ediation is compared with
adjudication ... but most mediated cases would have been handled by negotiation").
120. Roper Starch Worldwide, Legal Dispute Study, http:www.arb-forum.comlibrary/roper
poll.html>> 5 (visited Dec. 13, 1999). See also American Financial Services Association, Lenders
Adopt Voluntary Standard on Arbitration Agreements, available at http://www.
americanfinsvcs.com/meetings/admin/uploads/ArbitrationAgreements-June2000.doc (last visited
June 14, 2002).
121. State Bar of Texas, Roper Poll Reveals Americans' Preferences for Resolving Legal
Issues: Majority Believe Arbitration Is Their Best Option, available at http://www.texasadr.org/
newsitems I .htm#roper.
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those satisfied with the imperfections of, say, arbitration by the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA), may not know about other providers
of arbitration. The satisfaction of clients today may be analogous to
imperfect measures of satisfaction in medical decision-making. Patients
may express satisfaction with a certain medication that involves substan-
tial side effects because they view the side effects as the "inevitable
price" of the positive effects; consumers might be far less satisfied if
made aware of other alternatives without side effects. Treatment of
depression is a classic example. Many antidepressant medications make
people feel much better, but an extraordinarily high percentage of people
report side effects.' 22 Indeed, recent research on antidepressants sug-
gests that placebos work as well in many studies as some of the best
known anti-depressants-and that the sugar pills may even lead to some
of the same changes in brain chemistry.'2 3 With such better research on
what individuals already believe about arbitration, and what they care
about in arbitration, we may develop better targeted messages to educate
individuals.
2. Attorneys
Although improving incentives for individuals to ask attorneys and
others about arbitration may help, attorneys, too, may need other clear
incentives. There is room for clearer obligations for attorneys to discuss
different kinds of arbitration with clients.1 4 If lawyers have a clearer
duty to discuss dispute resolution, it may promote client attention. Some
clients may be less suspicious that lawyers are simply discussing choices
to run up their hourly bills.' 25
3. Arbitration Providers
Exactly how we improve the incentives of arbitration providers,
122. See generally Lindsay DeVane, Keeping Depression at Bay, available at 2002 WL
11470228 (Aug. 6, 2001); see also Tammy Chernin, Maintaining Mental Health: The New Focus
is on Maximizing Benefits and Minimizing Side Effects, available at 2001 WL 8119261 (June 4,
2001).
123. See Andrew F. Leuchter et al., Changes in Brain Function of Depressed Subjects During
Treatment with Placebo, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 122 (2002). In both medicine and law, existing
payment arrangements may distort decision making. Medication without side effects may be
more expensive, but consumers with insurance will often bear little of the cost of the other
medication. In a similar way, individuals with insurance coverage might be more satisfied with
other types of dispute resolution, but will typically bear none of any additional cost of other
dispute resolution because insurers typically bear all of the costs of covered dispute resolution.
124. See supra text accompanying note 75 (discussing how existing law makes it unclear how
much attorneys need to discuss arbitration with clients).
125. Of course, if bars lobby to impose a requirement that their members discuss arbitration in
greater detail, clients might still blame lawyers in general, but not their own lawyer-much as
Congress is held in disrepute, but incumbents regularly re-elected.
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such as the AAA, is a very difficult problem. As we saw earlier, estab-
lished arbitration providers face very little competition for understanda-
ble reasons. If an individual tries to designate a new provider in a
contract, this may signal a danger to other parties to the contract. More-
over, courts may reasonably be skeptical that a party that designates a
new provider is designating a biased provider. Yet competition between
providers is crucial to the market success of arbitration. Even if arbitra-
tion's only appeal is to improve efficiency, competition is important.
Moreover, if we take seriously Ware's suggestion that arbitrators might
develop not just better procedures but even better substantive legal prin-
ciples, 2 6 competition becomes even more important.
One solution to the lack of information is to increase oversight by
some other set of actors. In a private form, this might involve monitor-
ing by trade organizations or groups of in-house counsel. Unfortunately,
as we saw, the incentives of in-house counsel may themselves represent
a principal-agency problem.' 27 Therefore, one alternative may be a
greater role for government regulation and licensing. If private parties
and courts are suspicious of the credentials and bias of new arbitrators
and new arbitral providers, then government agencies might serve to
validate these credentials. A more modest version might involve certifi-
cation of credentials, 128 but allowing parties to use non-certified arbitra-
tors; a stricter version would require licensing and permit using only
licensed arbitrators.' 29 In addition to improving incentives, licensing
might be an opportunity to gather more information about arbitration
results so individuals can learn enough about what actually happens in
arbitration to make better informed decisions.
B. Overcoming Barriers
1. Improving Comparisons by Attorneys and State Statutes
As we have seen, one of the largest areas for improvement involves
126. See generally Ware, supra note 3.
127. See supra text accompanying note 77.
128. For an example of a related proposal, see the draft report of the ABA Task Force on e-
commerce, page 9, available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/webpolicy.html#.
129. Such licensing schemes might play a larger role as an alternative to greater review of
arbitral awards. One objection to greater review of arbitral awards is that it denies parties to a
particular arbitration the finality that may have attracted them, in part, to arbitration. A licensing
scheme might allow a government agency to discipline-or remove-arbitrators who behaved
badly in a set of arbitrations without disturbing the finality of any particular arbitration. The
nature of the licensing review, in turn, would depend on how we resolve the question of whether
arbitrators should follow the same rules of decision as courts. If we think that arbitrators should,
then one basis to a complaint about an arbitrator or provider would be that the arbitrator deviated
from the proper rules of decision.
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the way that comparisons are conveyed between arbitration and various
alternatives. This involves two distinct kinds of changes.
First, discussions of informed consent about arbitration need to be
tied more generally to informed consent about dispute resolution. Cur-
rent state regulation attempts largely warn only about the dangers of
arbitration and rights "waived."' 3 ° When only agreements with arbitra-
tion mention "waiving" rights, ordinary habits of loss aversion will
make people not want to "lose" something. Instead, one might require
disclosure not just where there was an arbitration clause, but also where
there was not. For example, law might provide that contracts should
include a provision along these lines: "This contract does not include an
arbitration, mediation, or alternative dispute resolution clause. In the
event of a dispute, you agree instead that you may go to court or reach
an agreement later to enter arbitration, mediation, or some other kind of
alternative dispute resolution." Proposals requiring that arbitration pro-
visions be part of a separate contract13 ' could be similarly broadened:
one might require that any provisions to modify dispute resolution,
whether to limit damages, to change the location of the forum, and so
on, be part of a separate contract. Or, one might require that any con-
tract (or some subset of contracts) have a separate agreement that speci-
fied the method for dispute resolution-even if this were the default
method of going to court. One intermediate way to enact such a provi-
sion would be to make it an ethical principle that lawyers drafting cer-
tain contracts should include such a separate dispute resolution
agreement. 32
The second set of changes involves the more particular content of
comparisons. As we have seen, there is a great need to make disclosures
more balanced and comparative. As we saw earlier, comparisons of the
formal features of appeal in court and in arbitration may be deceptive.
Likewise consider the question of "costs" and "fees." Like several other
lower courts, an Eleventh Circuit opinion refused to enforce an arbitra-
tion agreement when there was a danger that the amount of fees would
deter consumer complaints. Although the Supreme Court in Green Tree
formally reversed the lower court's decision on the ground there was not
sufficient proof of the amount of fees and the effect of such fees on the
dispute, the Court majority and dissent both narrowly focused on the
single element of fees.'33
130. See supra text accompanying notes 85-92.
131. For California legislation, see California Assembly Bill 2504 (2002).
132. It is also worth noting that the state statutes that have come before the Court have
addressed the enforcement of existing contracts rather than advice about drafting. I am grateful to
Rick Williamson for making this suggestion.
133. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92-97 (2000).
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It would be more useful to expand the comparisons. At a very for-
mal level, the courts are correct to note that courts do not require indi-
viduals to pay for individual judges, while arbitrations, in contrast,
typically require parties to pay sometimes hefty fees for arbitrators. On
the other hand, the emphasis only upon these costs may be deceptive in
at least two ways. First, because of its lack of evidentiary rules and
other kinds of formal procedures, individuals may be more able to make
do without an attorney. 134 What individuals pay for arbitrators may be
more than offset by the savings in attorneys' fees. Second, what individ-
uals pay up front for arbitration may be balanced by savings in time in
the shortness of arbitration. Of course, the familiar claims of the speed
and informality of arbitration may, in particular cases or even most
cases, not occur in practice. 135 Lack of evidentiary rules and discovery
may lead to higher costs. (Discovery may take place in hearings with
the fees of attorneys and arbitrators running; the tendency to admit every
bit of evidence may increase the hearing time.) At the end of the day, it
may be difficult to calculate in advance precisely when arbitration saves
time and/or money taking into account all the costs and potential sav-
ings. Overall, however, the formalism of emphasizing only one aspect
of the costs is deceptive and a poor basis for helping individuals make
informed choices.
2. Reconsidering Secrecy in Arbitration
Ultimately, the quest for autonomy may lead us to reconsider the
commitment to the secrecy of arbitration. If we try to move away from
formal features, we face the difficulty of describing experiences about
which we "know" very little. In part, this reflects the often denounced
lack of empirical research. But, also in part, this shortcoming reflects
again the paradox of privacy in arbitration: we cannot study what hap-
pens in arbitration because private providers rarely make meaningful
data available. This shortcoming highlights a crucial need for rethinking
our commitment to the secrecy of arbitration. It is true that many parties
seek arbitration because of its private nature.' 36 Nevertheless, some
arbitral forums involve some degree of public access. 37 Even when
134. See KRITZER, supra note 74, at 151 (discussing how parties in labor arbitration
represented by nonlawyers did as well as those represented by lawyers).
135. See supra text accompanying note 25.
136. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 41, at 5 (noting that an appeal of international
commercial arbitration is its secrecy); Freshman, supra note 42, at 1743-48 (noting that an appeal
of community resolution of disputes involving lesbians and gays is privacy).
137. The Jewish Conciliation Board of New York was designed as a community dispute
resolution forum, but was open to the public. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 91. The Board,
however, declined to let its live proceedings be broadcast. Id. at 97. But see Freshman, supra
note 42, at 1758 (suggesting that a major appeal of the Jewish Conciliation Board was to protect
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there is not access to arbitration itself, parties typically have the right to
disclose arbitration awards and any other material from the arbitra-
tion.' 38 And arbitration involves enough attractions other than privacy
that it could still function even if it were made more accessible to the
public.' 3 9 Opening up such arbitration will likely require new legisla-
tion. This does not necessarily require opening all arbitration to the pub-
lic. Just as some argue that the law may develop sufficiently as long as
"enough" cases do not settle, so too there may be optimal information
about arbitration if "enough" arbitrations are more public.
140
V. CONCLUSION
Renewed attention to the values of ADR and arbitration gives us
occasion to take more seriously the rich potential of arbitration. That
potential includes not merely private values like cost or time savings,
but public values such as the promotion of real autonomy, including the
kind of autonomy crucial to a deliberative democracy. As it has
evolved, however, the market for arbitration only imperfectly promotes
autonomy. If we take the potential of arbitration to promote autonomy
more seriously, then we must begin rethinking how we approach arbitra-
tion. Some of this involves relatively mechanical details, such as
rethinking how lawyers and others describe arbitration. In part, how-
ever, this also involves rethinking some established practices of arbitra-
tion, including its secretive nature.
the reputation of the Jewish community by keeping disputes within the community out of the
public eye).
138. See, e.g., A.T. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 989 P.2d 219, 223-24 (Colo. Ct. App.
1999); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Trading Dispute Is Shrouded in Accusations of Bias, N.Y. TIMES
May 15, 2002, at Cl (reporting claim in securities arbitration that broker treated an Arab client
worse). Rules of some arbitration providers, however, attempt to limit the right of parties to
disclose information learned in the arbitration. See, e.g., National Arbitration Forum, Code of
Procedure Rule 4, available at http://www.arb-forum.com/arbitration/NAF/Codelinked/
Part I.htm#Rule%204 (last visited June I, 2002) ("Arbitration proceedings are confidential, unless
all Parties agree otherwise arbitration orders and awards are not confidential. A Party who
improperly discloses confidential information shall be subject to sanctions. The Arbitrator and
Forum may disclose case filings, case disposition, and other case information as required by
applicable law.").
139. By analogy, many say that secrecy in settlements is a sine qua non of settlements.
Nevertheless, several states have limited the ability of private parties to keep settlements secret,
and yet settlements continue to occur. In Florida, for example, insurers must report in detail the
settlement of any malpractice claim by doctors, dentists, HMOs, attorneys, and certain other
professionals. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.912 (West 2002). In addition, the Florida Department of
Insurance has made a summary of such reports, including the name of the person/entity allegedly
committing malpractice and the settlement amounts available on a publicly accessible website.
See http://www.doi.state.fl.us/Consumers/Indextext.html.
140. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 500-02 (1985).
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